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TREATING APPLES LIKE ORANGES: THE
BENEFITS OF EXEMPTING COMMUNITY
BANKS FROM THE VOLCKER RULE
by: Gregory Butz*
ABSTRACT
In response to the Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that
followed, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act in 2010. The Volcker Rule is a controversial section of
the Dodd–Frank Act that prohibits all banks, no matter their size, from pro-
prietary trading and entering into certain relationships with private equity
funds. But the Volcker Rule forces banks to incur significant costs to ensure
compliance. While Big Banks have the capital and infrastructure to comply
with the Volcker Rule, small Community Banks often do not. This gives Big
Banks an unfair competitive advantage over Community Banks. However, re-
cently there has been renewed interest in the Volcker Rule, particularly regard-
ing its effects on Community Banks. Both the legislative and executive
branches are calling for changes to the Volcker Rule. But there is no consen-
sus on how the Volcker Rule should be changed and what types of financial
institutions those changes should affect. This Article will explore this issue.
First, this Article will discuss the background of the Financial Crisis, Great
Recession of 2008, Dodd–Frank, and the Volcker Rule. Second, this Article
differentiates between the business models of Big Banks and Community
Banks. Third, this Article examines the Volcker Rule’s effect on Community
Banks. Fourth, this Article will consider recent proposals for changes to the
Volcker Rule by the House of Representatives, Senate, and the Department of
Justice. Finally, this Article will argue that Community Banks should be ex-
empted from the Volcker Rule, preferably by a bill recently proposed by the
Senate Banking Committee.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than ten years have passed since the Great Recession of 2008,
and the American economy has recovered and is thriving once more.
Today, U.S. financial markets continuously reach new record highs.1
One could give some credit for this recovery to the policymakers and
regulators who enacted laws and promulgated regulations in the years
following the outset of the Financial Crisis. These rules and regula-
tions arguably do make the U.S. financial markets more secure and
safer for consumers.2 Despite the beneficial effects of these laws and
regulations, they also have detrimental effects, especially on small fi-
nancial institutions.3 Indeed, even one sponsor of Dodd–Frank admits
that the law places too much of a financial burden on Small Banks and
could use modification to address this issue.4 One section of
Dodd–Frank in particular, the Volcker Rule, has placed a dispropor-
tionate cost on small financial institutions.5 The Volcker Rule limits
the types of investments a financial institution can make with its own
capital, regardless of its size.6
The Volcker Rule places a disproportionate burden on Community
Banks because they do not typically enter into these types of invest-
1. Sue Chang & Mark DeCambre, Stock Market Gains as Dow Industries Mark
40th Record Close of 2017, MARKET WATCH (Sept. 18, 2017, 4:40 PM), http://www
.marketwatch.com/story/dow-sp-500-line-up-for-fresh-records-to-start-the-week-2017-
09-18 [https://perma.cc/PQE7-LHUA].
2. Walter Frick, What You Should Know About Dodd–Frank and What Happens
If It’s Rolled Back, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 2, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/what-you-
should-know-about-dodd-frank-and-what-happens-if-its-rolled-back [https://perma.cc/
EGE4-QNUU].
3. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation is Needed to Pre-
serve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015
MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 283 (2015).
4. Saheli Roy Choudhury, Yes, Banking Regulations Need Reform, But Don’t Kill
Dodd–Frank, Barney Frank Says, CNBC (Feb. 6, 2017, 12:07 AM), https://www.cnbc
.com/2017/02/06/barney-frank-dodd-frank-needs-reforms-under-trump-white-house
.html [https://perma.cc/X4NE-EJZT].
5. Amanda R. Huff, The Volcker Rule: The Prohibitions, Compliance and the
Cost on the Small Bank, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 81, 99 (2013).
6. See id.
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ments but still have to pay for the costs of compliance.7 The issue has
not escaped the notice of regulators and legislatures, who have been
calling for loosening regulations on Community Banks almost since
the inception of Dodd–Frank.8 This Article will explore those propos-
als, their potential effects, and ultimately argue for an exemption to
the Volcker Rule for Community Banks.
Part II provides a brief background of the Financial Crisis and the
Dodd–Frank legislation, which resulted from the crisis. Part III de-
scribes the basic framework of the Volcker Rule and the reason for its
inclusion in the Dodd–Frank legislation. Part IV classifies Big Banks,
Regional Banks, and Community Banks, and compares each of their
different functions. Part V discusses the disproportionate burdens that
the Volcker Rule places on Community Banks. Part VI contemplates
the recent proposals by Congress and regulators to address these bur-
dens. Part VII recommends the Senate’s bill or Treasury Depart-
ment’s proposal as the best options to alleviate this problem. And
finally, Part VIII concludes this Article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Financial Crisis of 2008
There are many factors that led to the Financial Crisis of 2008, and
the root causes are still a widely debated topic.9 While full delineation
of all the factors that led to the financial collapse is beyond this Arti-
cle’s purview, this Section explains how financial market deregulation
has contributed to the financial collapse.
The first major piece of legislation to regulate banks was the Bank-
ing Act of 1933 (“Glass–Steagall Act”).10 Passed in response to the
market crash of 1929,11 the Glass–Steagall Act prohibited all banks
from engaging in most investment and trading activities, with the ex-
ception of buying, selling, and trading of government bonds and other
similar low-risk investments.12 The Glass–Steagall Act also created
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), which still
functions today.13 The FDIC insures consumer and business deposits
7. Id.
8. Alan Rappeport, Bill to Erase Some Dodd–Frank Banking Rules Passes in
House, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/business/deal
book/house-financial-regulations-dodd-frank.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/H232-
6246].
9. Devan Goldstein, The Glass–Steagall Act: What it is and Why it Matters,
NERDWALLET (May 2, 2017), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/glass-stea-
gall-act-explained/ [https://perma.cc/5XBR-ABSL].
10. Huff, supra note 5, at 84.
11. Id.
12. Goldstein, supra note 9.
13. See Who is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/about/
learn/symbol/ (last updated May 3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NJG7-A77N].
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up to $250,000 in the event of a bank failure.14 The Glass–Steagall Act
was passed, in part, to lower the risk of insuring such deposits.15
In response to years of lobbying from the banking industry, Con-
gress passed the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 2000.16 The
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act was passed to cure the years of supposed
over-regulation of the banking industry and partially repealed the
Glass–Steagall Act.17 The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act allowed bank
holding companies to deal securities,18 “effectively crossing the fire-
wall between commercial and investment banking.”19 The reasoning
was that deregulation would allow banks to diversify their profit-seek-
ing activities and allow broad banking, thereby reducing the risk of
bankruptcy.20 “Broad banking” refers to the expanded range of activi-
ties and services that banks could enter into after the passing of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act.21 In 2000, shortly after the passing of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, the tech stock bubble collapsed.22 The
“tech stock bubble” refers to the downward shift in the economy fol-
lowing steep gains in the financial markets in the late 1990s due to the
advent of the internet.23 This event prompted the Federal Reserve to
aggressively cut interest rates several times, from 6.5% in 2000 to 1%
by 2003, in order to ease the impact of the tech bubble’s collapse on
the financial markets.24 This ultra-low interest rate environment made
it very attractive for banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve be-
cause inflation outpaced interest rates in such a way that “the Federal
Reserve was in effect paying banks to borrow money.”25
During the same period of time, these ultra-low interest rates
caused financial institutions to seek out new types of loan products
that attracted customers who previously may not have sought to enter
into loan agreements.26 These types of loans caused many American
households to incur more debt, which caused the simultaneous de-
crease in disposable income.27 Financial institutions were engaged in
the practice of finding customers and “lock[ing] [them] into complex
14. Id.
15. Goldstein, supra note 9.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of
2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 557 (2009).
19. Goldstein, supra note 9.
20. Quinn, supra note 18, at 558–59.
21. James R. Barth et al., Policy Watch: The Repeal of Glass–Steagall and the Ad-
vent of Broad Banking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 192 (2000).
22. Quinn, supra note 18, at 562.
23. Andrew Beattie, Market Crashes: The Dotcom Crash (2000–2002), INVES-
TOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/features/crashes/crashes8.asp (last visited Mar.
6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/24SJ-26NK].
24. Quinn, supra note 18, at 562.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 563.
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loans with hidden [fees].”28 As interest rates decreased, customers
took out loans with the expectation that they could refinance their
loans as interest rates continued to fall.29 But the housing market sub-
sequently collapsed, and banks began to foreclose on customers that
fell behind on their mortgages payments.30 Essentially, banks were
gambling with huge amounts of borrowed money.31 Banks were self-
regulating, lending rules were not being enforced, and the “taxpayers
were on the hook if a [B]ig [B]ank” ever went under on account of its
risky bets.32 During this time, there was a growing consensus among
many in the federal government that the current Financial Crisis was
aggravated by the deregulation of the U.S. banking sector.33 As a re-
sult, legislators began to search for solutions that moved away from
deregulation and moved toward increased governmental oversight.34
In order to stop such a financial crisis in the future, the U.S. govern-
ment responded with a massive piece of financial legislation: the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.35
B. Dodd–Frank
In response to the Financial Crisis of 2008, Congress passed the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in
2010.36 The devastating effect that the Financial Crisis had on the U.S.
economy can hardly be understated. According to an industry expert:
Following the American and global [F]inancial [C]risis, there was
legitimate political demand to try to prevent it from repeating. And
the cost in terms of lost output, lost jobs, lost houses, lost opportuni-
ties, as well as political repercussions, was so enormous that it
seemed to mandate a very big rethinking of the financial system.
The rethink took place in the context of a lot of skepticism (at best)
about the banking system, the banking business model, and its con-
tribution to American well-being.37
While the Dodd–Frank Act is an ambitious and complicated piece of
legislation, it can be broken down into five core components. First,
Dodd–Frank raises the amount of self-owned capital that banks are
required to maintain on hand, meaning more of their own funds are at
28. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) [hereinafter
Obama Remarks], available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-
act [https://perma.cc/XZ5C-Z2KU]; Huff, supra note 5, at 85–86.
29. See Quinn, supra note 18, at 565–67; Huff, supra note 5, at 86.
30. Quinn, supra note 18, at 567; Huff, supra note 5, at 86.
31. Obama Remarks, supra note 28; Huff, supra note 5, at 86.
32. Obama Remarks, supra note 28; Huff, supra note 5, at 86.
33. Huff, supra note 5, at 86.
34. See id.
35. Frick, supra note 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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risk when lending.38 Second, Dodd–Frank restricts certain types of
lending activities that banks previously engaged in, such as the non-
transparent practice of splitting and bundling loans into investment
products.39 The third component of Dodd–Frank, particularly aimed
at Big Banks, is the requirement for financial institutions to imple-
ment living wills, which makes it less difficult for regulators to shut
down a failing financial institution if another crisis takes place.40 A
fourth and significant component of Dodd–Frank is the requirement
that large financial institutions submit to stress tests.41 Stress tests are
useful because they force Big Banks to be aware of the risks they
face:42
Stress tests are a specific form of simulation developed by the Fed-
eral Reserve and other central banks to allow [regulators] to figure
out how badly a given financial institution’s portfolio would hold up
if there was a broad sell-off across [many] asset classes or a specific
kind of shock like [the economy] suffered in 2008.43
Stress tests are also a powerful tool because they require financial in-
stitutions to disclose results to regulators, who may in turn use the
information to determine their level of oversight on financial intu-
itions.44 Finally, the Dodd–Frank Act implements the Volcker Rule,
as discussed below.
III. THE VOLCKER RULE
A. Framework
This Section provides an overview of the essential components of
the Volcker Rule. It discusses the types of relationships and trading
activities that banks are prohibited from entering into generally and
notes a few major exceptions to the Volcker Rule. This Section con-
cludes with a discussion of the five institutions that enforce the
Volcker Rule.
Considered “the linchpin of the Dodd–Frank Act,”45 the Volcker
Rule prohibits many types of investment activities and relationships a
bank may enter into.46 Due to the Volcker Rule’s complexity, as well
as lobbying from the banking industry, it was the last piece of the








45. Huff, supra note 5, at 86.
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012).
47. Neil Irwin, Everything You Need to Know About the Volcker Rule, WASH.
POST (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/12/10/
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vides for two major restrictions. First, all U.S. banks are prohibited
from “owning, sponsoring, or having certain relationships” with par-
ticular types of hedge funds or private equity funds.48 Second, the
Volcker Rule implements a very broad prohibition on an investment
activity known as proprietary trading.49 “Proprietary trading” refers to
the practice of financial institutions engaging in investment activities
with its own capital—rather than customer capital—for the purposes
of generating additional profit for themselves, rather than their cus-
tomers.50 All U.S. banking organizations are “restricted from engag-
ing in proprietary trading of securities, derivatives, commodity futures
and options for their own account.”51 Trading positions held in a fi-
nancial institution’s own funds that range from one day to sixty days
are presumed to be proprietary trading.52 CEOs of financial institu-
tions must attest to compliance with the Volcker Rule, and every em-
ployee of a financial institution is legally liable for Volcker Rule
violations.53
Despite its broad language, the Dodd–Frank Act carves out excep-
tions to the Volcker Rule. Most importantly, financial institutions are
still permitted to trade on their clients’ behalf.54 Therefore, the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act remains intact. This exception also allows a
financial institution to buy investments through drawing from a fund
that contains both its own money and its clients’ money, so long as its
own money does not exceed 3%.55 A second major exception to the
Volcker Rule allows certain types of trading that a financial institution
must engage in to run its business, such as currency trading.56 A third
major exception to the Volcker Rule allows “[t]he purchase, sale, ac-
quisition, or disposition of obligations of the United States or any
agency” by a financial institution.57 This exception allows financial in-
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-volcker-rule/?utm_term=.4143597b4004
[https://perma.cc/J4LD-Y2AU].
48. THOMAS W. KILLIAN, THE VOLCKER RULE’S IMPACT ON REGIONAL AND
COMMUNITY BANKS: SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITS BANK INVESTMENT IN STRUCTURED




50. Heather Stewart, What is ‘Proprietary Trading’?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2010,
2:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jan/21/proprietary-trading-wall-
street-banks [https://perma.cc/8DB3-KRE4].
51. KILLIAN, supra note 48.
52. Matt Levine, Goldman Sachs Actually Read the Volcker Rule, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 22, 2015, 12:51 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-01-22/
goldman-sachs-actually-read-the-volcker-rule [https://perma.cc/Q3NG-D3WF].
53. Kimberly Amadeo, Six Ways the Volcker Rule Protects You (and Why Banks
Hate It), BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/volcker-rule-summary-3305905 (last
updated May 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/V68M-NWDQ].
54. Id.
55. Levine, supra note 52.
56. Amadeo, supra note 53.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (2012).
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stitutions to purchase securities, such as bonds, that the federal gov-
ernment issues. A fourth major exception to the Volcker Rule
provides for a substantial catchall. Banks may enter into “[s]uch other
activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission determine . . . would promote and protect the safety and
soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the
United States.”58 In other words, a financial institution may engage in
an otherwise prohibited activity if the federal regulators who enforce
the Volcker Rule allow a financial institution to do so.
B. Agencies that Enforce the Volcker Rule
In 2013, four federal regulators approved regulations regarding the
enforcement of the Volcker Rule. These regulators include the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); the Federal Reserve; the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”); the FDIC; and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), which is a
division of the Department of the Treasury. These agencies oversee
the enforcement of the Volcker Rule. The FDIC regulates the major-
ity of Community Banks, with the remainder split between the OCC
and the Federal Reserve.59 The SEC is responsible for monitoring
Volcker Rule compliance with registered broker-dealers, investment
advisers, security-based swap dealers, majority security-based swap
participants, and investment companies.60 Finally, the Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) also enforces the Volcker Rule.
The CFPB is a unique and controversial agency. The Dodd–Frank Act
created the CFPB, which is an “independent agency within another
independent agency, the FDIC.”61 The CFPB possesses a great
amount of autonomy because Congress does not directly control its
budget, and the President cannot remove the head of the agency with-
out cause.62 In addition, the CFPB possesses the ability to conduct
58. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(J).
59. Ryan Tracy, Exempting Small Banks From Volcker Rule Is Popular, but Not
With Their Regulator, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2017, 12:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/exempting-small-banks-from-volcker-rule-is-popular-but-not-with-their-regu
lator-1514294938 [https://perma.cc/S2P9-4VG2].
60. Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: SEC May Seek More Power to Enforce Volcker
Rule, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2014, 10:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financi
al-regulation-volcker/exclusive-sec-may-seek-more-power-to-enforce-volcker-rule-id
USBREA0F19K20140116 [https://perma.cc/7PHQ-9KZC].
61. Laurence Arnold & Elizabeth Dexheimer, What You Need to Know About the
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onsite compliance checks and can impose steep penalties for regula-
tory violations.63
C. Reasons for the Volcker Rule’s Inclusion
in the Dodd–Frank Act
Ironically, one argument for including the Volcker Rule in the
Dodd–Frank Act was that it would prevent larger banks from acquir-
ing smaller banks. The Volcker Rule attempts to prevent banks from
becoming too big to fail and mitigate the damage caused by the partial
repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act.64 Before the Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Act, investment banks were small and did not need to be regulated.65
By contrast, commercial banks could loan money to consumers at reg-
ulated rates and could make a profit on thin margins due to the im-
mense reserves to depositor funds. With the passing of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Big Banks could trade with depositor
funds without regulation, thereby producing greater returns than con-
ventional loan products.66 This gave banks with an investment-bank-
ing arm a competitive advantage over other banks that did not engage
in investment activity.67 This situation allowed Big Banks to acquire
smaller banks, which allowed Big Banks to grow even bigger.68 There-
fore, the Volcker Rule was passed to help prevent Big Banks from
growing to an unreasonable size, as such growth would lead to govern-
ment bailouts in the event of a bank failure.69
Prominent supporters and lobbyists in the banking industry argue
that there is no direct link to any bank failures—or near-failures of
banks that government bailouts saved—to risky investment practices.
Indeed, while there may be many causes underlying the Financial Cri-
sis and the Great Recession, most research (and the analysis above)
indicates that the Housing Crisis was the significant factor leading to
the Financial Crisis, not bank investments in proprietary trading.70
But Volcker Rule proponents state that while proprietary trading
might not have been the leading cause of the Financial Crisis, losses
resulting from this type of activity nonetheless contributed to the cri-
sis.71 Additionally, these proponents argue that the Volcker Rule will
prevent speculative trading that may destabilize the economy in the
63. Susan Thomas Springer, What Happens When a Bank Hits $10 Billion?, INDEP.
BANKER (Feb. 27, 2017), http://independentbanker.org/2017/02/what-happens-when-
a-bank-hits-10-billion/ [https://perma.cc/4S65-MKU7].






70. Quinn, supra note 18, at 562–67.
71. Irwin, supra note 47.
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future.72 Perhaps the reason for the inclusion of the Volcker Rule in
the Dodd–Frank Act was to curtail the ability of banks to enter into
any type of risky bet that might once again endanger the global econ-
omy, regardless of whether those risky bets took the form of invest-
ment trading or high-risk lending.
IV. TYPES OF BANKS
Articles and news outlets often use the terms Big Banks, Regional
Banks, and Small Banks or Community Banks, but many fail to define
what these labels actually mean. This Section of the Article will at-
tempt to do so.
A. Big Banks
The term “Big Banks” is probably the most used out of these three
types of banks. Indeed, the definition became popular prior to the
Financial Crisis of 2008. One might justifiably think of America’s five
biggest banks when trying to define the term “Big Bank”: namely,
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and U.S.
Bancorp.73 After all, these are arguably America’s most recognizable
financial institutions. These banks control a substantial portion of
America’s assets under management.74 As of 2015, “[t]he largest five
banks in the U.S. . . . control[led] nearly 45[%] of the industry’s total
assets.”75 But this Article takes the view that this definition is too nar-
row. The definition should also include the next five biggest banks:
Morgan Stanley, U.S. Bancorp, PNC Financial Services Group, TD
Group US Holdings, and Capital One.76 Together, these ten financial
institutions control $11.8 trillion in assets.77 All this money combined
would be “enough to buy every one of the 7.6 billion human beings on
Earth a 13-inch MacBook Pro, with a little left over for accessories.”78
Put another way, the smallest of the Big Banks, Capital One, who
manages $348.55 billion in assets, has “a sum so large that, if con-
verted into $100 bills laid end to end, would reach the moon (with
several thousand miles left over to check out the view).”79 Moreover,
72. Id.
73. Jeff Cox, 5 Biggest Banks Now Own Almost Half the Industry, CNBC (Apr. 15,
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many Big Banks have grown even larger since the Financial Crisis.80
Even with the addition of these five institutions, the ten Big Banks
still make up a minuscule number of financial institutions compared to
the entire number of all the U.S. financial institutions. For example, in
2013, the six largest banks held 67% of the $14.4 trillion of the United
States’ banking assets.81 That number is out of 6,934 total banks in the
United States.82
B. Community Banks
In both the banking industry and the federal government, there is
no apparent consensus on what exactly a Community Bank (or Small
Bank) is. Indeed, there even seems to be confusion over the definition
of the word within the same governmental agency.83 The OCC defines
a Community Bank as a bank with under $10 billion in assets.84 The
FDIC has offered conflicting definitions of Community Banks in the
past, at times stating that they are banks under $1 billion in assets, and
at other times stating that they are banks with less than $10 billion in
assets.85
The best way to look at Community Banks is in the context of the
CFPB’s regulatory ability. While Community Banks are required to
follow the rules that CFPB promulgates, the CFPB does not have di-
rect regulatory oversight of Community Banks.86 The cutoff point for
CFPB oversight, including direct oversight of the Volcker Rule, is $10
billion.87 Therefore, Community Banks should be defined as banks
with less than $10 billion in assets.
Community Banks play a very important role, primarily in local
communities.88 Community Banks often reinvest their profits into the
local economy and provide jobs to the communities.89 Big Banks may
use a deposit made by a customer on one side of the country to lend to
80. Stephen Gandel, By Every Measure, the Big Banks are Bigger, FORTUNE




83. Ken Tumin, How Do You Define a Community Bank?, DEPOSITACCOUNTS
(Dec. 20, 2012), https://www.depositaccounts.com/blog/2012/12/how-do-you-define-a-
community-bank.html [https://perma.cc/PVQ3-DK7C].
84. Douwe Miedema, U.S. Regulator Estimates Volcker Rule’s Cost for Banks,




86. Springer, supra note 63.
87. Id.
88. Community Banks Build Communities, INDEP. COMMUNITY BANKERS OF AM.,
http://www.icba.org/about/community-banking (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) [https://per
ma.cc/8PPL-LHTU].
89. Id.
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a customer on the other side of the country.90 In contrast, Community
Banks take deposits and lend to customers who live in the same local
community.91 Community Banks often have more latitude to extend
loans to customers and may take more factors into account than Big
Banks when deciding to extend credit, such as family history and dis-
cretionary spending.92 In that same vein, Community Banks are also
able to make quicker decisions because underwriting decisions are
made locally, rather than in a different part of the country.93 Indeed,
despite the continued growth of Big Banks in recent years,94 Commu-
nity Banks are the preferred lender for small businesses.95 Addition-
ally, Community Banks approve more loan applications, more often
than Big Banks.96 According to a 2016 press release by New York’s
Federal Reserve Bank, Community Banks have “extended at least
some of the financing requested to 76[%] of applicants. Large banks
approved 58[%] of applicants.”97 These factors illustrate that Commu-
nity Banks focus primarily on lending, whereas Big Banks are in-
volved in many different activities in the financial industry.
C. Regional Banks
If Community Banks are extremely small financial institutions and
Big Banks are extremely large financial institutions, Regional Banks
fill the space in between. There is a “vast expanse between community
lenders and their money-center brethren. Sandwiched in the middle
are a wide array of [R]egional [B]anks.”98 Simply put, Regional Banks
encompass every other type of bank other than Big Banks and Com-
munity Banks. More specifically, this space encompasses every bank
with over $10 billion in assets to just below $201.3 billion in assets,
which is the size of the smallest Big Bank.99 Once a former Commu-
nity Bank passes the $10 billion mark to become a Regional Bank, it
comes under the oversight of the CFPD.100 After a bank passes this
$10 billion milestone, “several federal regulations kick in,” including a





94. Gandel, supra note 80.
95. Federal Reserve Banks Release Report on Credit Experiences of Small Busi-




98. John Maxfield, Regional Banks: Investing Essentials, MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 1,
2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/08/01/regional-banks-
investing-essentials.aspx [https://perma.cc/7H4H-YR7G].
99. Dixon, supra note 76.
100. Springer, supra note 63.
101. Id.
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stand the context of different types of banks, one must understand
where Regional Banks fit within the confines of the banking industry.
While I invite future discussion on the subject, the effect of the
Volcker Rule on Regional Banks is beyond the purview of this
Article.
V. VOLCKER RULE’S EFFECT ON COMMUNITY BANKS
The Volcker Rule puts an unfair and disproportionate burden on
Community Banks compared to Big Banks. Since the Volcker Rule’s
implementation, Community Banks have suffered. By far, the biggest
burden the Volcker Rule places on Community Banks is ongoing com-
pliance costs.102 Specifics on how much Dodd–Frank cost the banking
industry in general, much less Community Banks specifically, are in-
consistent and difficult to quantify.103 The U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce blames bank regulators for the lack of economic data regarding
the Volcker Rule.104 The OCC estimates (in an incredibly wide range)
the Volcker Rule cost the banking industry between $413 million and
$4.3 billion.105 These numbers represent a one-time cost over a year to
put compliance measures in place.106 While Big Banks incurred much
of these costs, Community Banks had to expend capital to follow the
Volcker Rule as well.107 But even now that these measures are put
into place, Community Banks continue to incur steep expenses to
comply with the Volcker Rule108 As small businesses, Community
Banks have less infrastructure, manpower, and capital than bigger
banks. Therefore, these types of compliance costs affect Community
Banks more heavily than Big Banks. That Community Banks are even
required to comply with the Volcker Rule is ironic because the vast
majority of Community Banks never engage in the activity prohibited
by the Volcker Rule, such as proprietary trading or entering into cer-
tain relationships with private equity funds.109 If exempted from the
Volcker Rule, Community Banks would likely not engage in this pro-
hibited behavior in the future.110
102. Emily Stephenson, U.S. Congress should exempt small banks from Volcker rule
– regulator, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2014, 11:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/finan-
cial-regulations-volcker/u-s-congress-should-exempt-small-banks-from-volcker-rule-
regulator-idUSL2N0TM0VR20141202 [https://perma.cc/EDR5-SRY6].
103. Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, How Much Did Dodd–Frank Cost? Don’t Ask
Banks, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.bna.com/doddfrank-cost-dont-
n57982083194/ [https://perma.cc/RAF4-NJEQ].




108. Stephenson, supra note 102.
109. STEVEN T. MNUCHIN & CRAIG S. PHILLIPS, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, A FINAN-
CIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES BANKS AND CREDIT UN-
IONS, 72 (2017).
110. Id.
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The Volcker Rule burdens Community Banks in more ways than
just compliance costs. Financial technology, also known as fintech,111
is one example of this continuing burden.112 The Volcker Rule makes
it difficult for financial institutions to invest in funds that invest in
fintech113 Essentially, “[f]inancial technology is broadly defined as any
technological innovation in financial services.”114 Fintech can include
more mundane technology, such as mobile banking applications, to
more exotic technology, such as cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and
Etherium.115 Though Community Banks typically do not enter into
risky investments, Community Banks would benefit by investing in
funds that invest in fintech because it may give them access to the
technology.116 The Volker Rule forces banks to either develop their
own fintech or invest in individual companies who develop fintech.117
Similar to compliance costs, this is less of a problem for larger banks
because they have the infrastructure, manpower, and capital to do
so.118 Community Banks work with fewer resources than Big Banks,
so to develop their own fintech is a riskier option for Community
Banks.119 Moreover, Community Banks are less likely to invest in in-
dividual companies.120 Whereas Big Banks are more willing to try to
navigate within the confines of the Volcker Rule, Community Banks
“have generally tried to steer clear of anything that might conflict with
the [Volcker] [R]ule for fear of running afoul of examiners.”121 If a
modification to the Volcker Rule is not made soon, Community Banks
are likely to miss out on current fintech innovations, once again put-
ting them at a disadvantage in relation to Big Banks.122
Even prior to the Financial Crisis of 2008, the Community Banking
Industry was in decline.123 This decline is troubling due to the valuable
role that Community Banks play in the economy. Since 1994, Commu-
nity Banks have decreased in number by 40%, and “[its] share of U.S.
111. Everything You’ve Always Wanted to Know About Fintech, CNBC, https://
www.cnbc.com/2017/10/02/fintech-everything-youve-always-wanted-to-know-about-fi-
nancial-technology.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YA59-XWT3].
112. Lalita Clozel, Small Banks’ Fintech Efforts Held Back by Volcker Rule,




114. Everything You’ve Always Wanted to Know About Fintech, supra note 111.
115. See id.







123. Carrie Sheffield, Dodd–Frank is Killing Community Banks, FORBES (Feb. 9,
2015, 9:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carriesheffield/2015/02/09/dodd-frank-is-
killing-community-banks/#5ee2289f73a7 [https://perma.cc/VJZ2-YYWU].
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banking assets fell by more than half—from 41[%] to 18[%]. In con-
trast, the biggest banks saw their share of assets rise from 18[%] to
46[%].”124 While Dodd–Frank did not cause this decline in Small
Banks, it is certainly exacerbating the problem.125 Since the passage of
Dodd–Frank, “[C]ommunity [B]anks have lost market share at a rate
double what they did” the previous four years.126 While exempting
Community Banks from the Volcker Rule will not completely fix this
decline, it will be one less burden they have to face, which will help
level the playing field in the banking industry.
VI. RECENT PROPOSALS TO MODIFY VOLCKER
There have been recent proposals that have attempted to modify or
completely repeal the Volcker Rule in both the legislative and execu-
tive branches. Some proposals are superior to others. This Section of
the Article will discuss these proposals.
A. Financial Choice Act
In June of 2017, the House of Representatives passed the Financial
Choice Act.127 The Act rolled back many of the Dodd–Frank regula-
tions, including a provision to entirely eliminate the Volcker Rule for
all financial institutions, whether large or small.128 While the Act ulti-
mately would have a beneficial impact on Community Banks, a more
nuanced law would have a greater beneficial effect on the economy as
a whole. At a surface level, this provision would cure the burden on
Community Banks, which are saddled by the administrative costs of
the Volcker Rule. Ironically, much like Dodd–Frank itself, the Finan-
cial Choice Act is overly broad. Despite the Volcker Rule’s shortcom-
ings, it does help protect the economy by prohibiting large financial
institutions from entering into risky investments that put the global
economy in jeopardy. Furthermore, it has been argued that even if the
Volcker Rule were to be repealed, it is unlikely that large financial
institutions would be affected because they have already expended a
large amount of capital instituting the administrative controls to com-
ply with the Volcker Rule.129 In either event, the Financial Choice Act
is unlikely to be passed due to the lack of bipartisanship in general.130
If the House of Representatives passed a less ambitious form of the
Financial Choice Act, such as the Senate Banking Committee’s ver-
sion of the banking reform bill, then there would be an increased like-




127. Financial Choice Act, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
128. Rappeport, supra note 8.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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B. Senate Bill
Like the House of Representatives, the Senate has been in the pro-
cess of trying to figure out an option to roll back some of the provi-
sions of Dodd–Frank.131 Recently, both Senate Republicans and
Democrats have attempted to draft a reform of Dodd–Frank that will
help relieve the regulatory burdens on Community Banks.132 In a rare
showing of bipartisanship, Republicans and Democrats on the Senate
Banking Committee recently compromised on a draft of a banking
reform bill.133 The bill exempts Community Banks with under $10 bil-
lion in assets from the Volcker Rule.134 Republican Senate Banking
Committee member Mike Crapo unveiled the bill.135 Whereas past ef-
forts to overhaul Dodd–Frank have failed because they went too far in
rolling back banking regulations, the current bill is more moderate.136
The bill recently passed in the Senate.137
Even though the bill passed in the Senate, it still might not pass in
the House. The House has a larger majority of Republicans than the
Senate, and House Republicans might feel like the bill does not go far
enough to curtail banking regulation in its current form. Additionally,
officials at the FDIC have come out against the bill, stating that it
could allow “new risks [to] creep into the banking system.”138 FDIC
Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig stated, “I think this would be a loop-
hole. It does open a door, if you are oriented to use deposits to specu-
late.”139 Despite these reasons, the Senate Banking Committee’s bill
looks like the best legislative chance to relieve Community Banks
from the Volcker Rule since Dodd–Frank was passed in 2008.140
C. Treasury Department Proposal
The Department of Treasury released a report in June of 2017 that
detailed its proposed changes to banking regulation. The report has a
131. Elizabeth Dexheimer, Banks Closer to Winning Regulatory Relief After Senate








137. Norbert Michel, The Crapo Bill Provides Regulatory Relief, But it Does Not




138. Tracy, supra note 59.
139. Id.
140. Pete Schroeder, Senate Committee Advances Bill Easing Banking Regulations,
REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-senate-
banks/senate-committee-advances-bill-easing-banking-regulations-idUSKBN1DZ3
6U [https://perma.cc/PHH2-MZJF].
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small—but important—section regarding the Volcker Rule and Com-
munity Banks. The section reads as follows:
Most [S]mall [B]anks do not engage in proprietary trading or invest
in or sponsor private equity funds and hedge funds. Although the
regulations provide banking entities with $10 billion or less in assets
with accommodations from the rule’s compliance program require-
ments, these banks have still been required to expend considerable
resources to ensure that their activities do not constitute prohibited
proprietary trading. In particular, such institutions, even if they do
not engage in any trading, have had to expend resources to confirm
that transactions they engage in for hedging their interest rate and
other business risks are permitted under the Volcker Rule. The rela-
tively small risk that these institutions pose to the financial system
does not justify the compliance burden of the rule, and the risk
posed by the limited amount of trading that banks of this size could
engage in and can easily be addressed through existing prudential
regulation and supervision. For these reasons, banking organiza-
tions with $10 billion or less in total consolidated assets should be
entirely exempt from all aspects of the Volcker Rule. This exemp-
tion would allow these banks to focus on their core business of lend-
ing to consumers and small and mid-size businesses.141
D. Best Proposal
Community Banks should be completely exempted from the
Volcker Rule. Some commentators argue for various types of reforms
to the Volcker Rule regarding Community Banks.142 Nevertheless,
these commentators state that Community Banks should refrain from
engaging in proprietary trading because of the increased risk it places
on local economies.143 For instance, commentators proposed that
Community Banks should sign a contract with regulators, promising
not to enter into prohibited investment activity.144 It would be easy to
agree with this reasoning and end the discussion at this point. After
all, Community Banks rarely engage in the type of activity prohibited
by the Volcker Rule,145 so why should it matter if they are required to
sign a contract? But these types of proposals fail to grasp the reason
why Congress passed the Volcker Rule in the first place. Congress
passed Dodd–Frank, and by extension the Volker Rule, to prevent
another event similar to the financial collapse of 2008. Even if a Com-
munity Bank were to enter into this type of investment activity (which
they are unlikely to do) and fail as a result of those activities, the
global economy would be minimally affected. However, small busi-
141. MNUCHIN & PHILLIPS, supra note 109, at 72–73.
142. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Angels, 50 GA. L. REV. 143, 160 (2015);
Huff, supra note 5, at 111.
143. Id.
144. Huff, supra note 5, at 111.
145. MNUCHIN & PHILLIPS, supra note 109, at 72–73.
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ness failures, including a Community Bank’s failure, can have detri-
mental effects on a local economy.146 While these types of events are
unfortunate, Congress has not seen fit to inject taxpayer capital into
or place extensive regulations on other types of local businesses. Com-
munity Banks should receive similar treatment as other types of small
businesses.
The counterargument to this point is that Community Banks receive
FDIC support, which differentiates them from other businesses.147
There were also government initiatives to help Community Banks
during the recession of 2008.148 However, these arguments do not sup-
port the policy of why the Volcker Rule was included in Dodd–Frank.
Congress passed the Volcker Rule to protect the economy from the
types of business activities Big Banks engaged in. To lump Community
Banks in with Big Banks violates the underlying policy of the Volcker
Rule.
The best option to alleviate the Volcker Rule’s effect on Commu-
nity Banks is the Senate Banking Committee’s version of the bill. This
is the best option because, if enacted into law, the bill would have
bicameral and executive support. If both parties compromise on the
bill, then both sides can claim a win. Republicans can claim they rolled
back a key provision of Dodd–Frank and decreased regulation; Dem-
ocrats can claim they retained restraints on Big Banks that protect the
economy. Both parties can claim that they helped small businesses.
However, it is viewed that the Senate’s bill would produce a stable
result and would be more likely to sustain regulatory relief of Com-
munity Banks through changes of political power from one party to
the other. This is not to say that that the Senate bill completely allevi-
ates the burden on Community Banks. Community Banks still have to
comply with other regulations that limit its trading activity.149 There-
fore, they will still have to maintain compliance staff for potential au-
dits.150 Nevertheless, if Congress exempted Community Banks from
the Volcker Rule, they will have to comply with one less major regula-
tion, allowing them to commit capital and manpower elsewhere. How-
ever, even if the Senate bill garners bipartisan support, it may still fall
by the wayside by being overshadowed by more hot button issues such
as healthcare reform or immigration. Therefore, other options warrant
consideration.
Though passing the Senate Banking Committee’s version of the bill
is the best option, another alternative exists. The President could at-
146. Schooner, supra note 142, at 151.
147. When a Bank Fails - Facts for Depositors, Creditors, and Borrowers, FED. DE-
POSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/ (last updated July 28,
2014) [https://perma.cc/HYN8-4BAH].
148. See Tracy, supra note 59.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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tempt to unilaterally adopt the Treasury Department’s proposal to ex-
empt Community Banks by a presidential executive order.151 The
115th Congress often has difficulty passing major legislation due to
disagreements both between different parties and even within the
same party. Reforming the Volcker Rule may not be any different.
Additionally, as noted above, the House and Senate bills differ with
regard to the Volcker Rule. If Congress is unable to find a consensus,
the President should issue an executive order to exempt Community
Banks from the Volcker Rule.152 Although this approach will not win
the favor of ardent supporters for the separation of powers, it could be
an effective tool to immediately alleviate the burden that the Volcker
Rule places on Community Banks.
There is a possible limitation to an executive order because the ma-
jority of the agencies that enforce the Volcker Rule are independently
managed. Dependent agencies are fully part of the executive
branch.153 Congress creates independent agencies, so they are not part
of the executive branch, thus the President has limited authority to
terminate the head of an independent agency.154 Independent agen-
cies have more autonomy from the federal government and are par-
tially funded by outside sources.155 The Department of Treasury, and
by extension the OCC, is a dependent agency.156 The SEC, CFTC, the
FDIC, and by extension the CFPB, are all independent agencies.157
Currently, due to independent agencies’ unique level of autonomy,
there is uncertainty that independent agencies, particularly the CFPB,
are required to follow executive orders like dependent agencies.158
But the President’s administration has previously clarified when an
executive order applies to an independent agency and when one does
151. Jeffrey L. Hare et al., Treasury’s Framework to Relax and “Improve” the
Volcker Rule: Key Recommended Changes, DLA PIPER (June 13, 2017), https://www
.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2017/06/treasury-framework-to-improve-
volcker-rule/ [https://perma.cc/LE6G-D38K].
152. See Rappeport, supra note 8.
153. Brian Bass, Difference Between Independent and Dependent Agencies, HOUS.
CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/difference-between-independent-dependent-
agencies-18731.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Q7KK-Q7MR].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Duties & Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, DEP’T OF
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx (last
updated Jan. 4, 2018, 12:29 PM) [https://perma.cc/X2WM-SYWL].
157. See Mary Jo White, The Fourteenth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Cor-
porate Securities & Financial Law at the Fordham Corporate Law Center: The Impor-
tance of Independence, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 5 (2014); see also Mission &
Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc
.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2018) [https://perma
.cc/RP6Y-39WT]; see also Who is the FDIC?, supra note 13.
158. Yuka Hayashi, Is CFPB Subject to Trump Executive Orders? No Easy Answer,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-cfpb-subject-to-
trump-executive-orders-no-easy-answer-1485946800 [https://perma.cc/YT2B-CPQW].
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not.159 Therefore, it is likely that if the President issued an executive
order exempting Community Banks from the Volcker Rule and ex-
plicitly stated that independent agencies are required to follow it, then
the CFPB, if not all independent agencies, would have to obey.
Even if independent agencies are not required to follow executive
orders, an executive order may still be appropriate for three reasons.
First, even if the SEC, CFPB, and FDIC are not required to follow an
executive order exempting Community Banks from the Volcker Rule,
the Department of Treasury still would be. Community Banks would
have one less agency’s regulations to follow, thereby reducing the bur-
dens imposed by the Volcker Rule. Second, even if the three indepen-
dent agencies are not required to follow the executive order, they may
nonetheless follow it to maintain uniformity in enforcement of the
Volcker Rule. Third, the President may appoint like-minded agency
heads that will follow the executive order. Indeed, there is speculation
that the President’s nominee to lead the FCIC, Jelena McWilliams,
who has not commented directly on the Volcker Rule, “is expected to
be more industry-friendly than the FDIC’s current leaders.”160 There-
fore, an executive order is still a valid option for exempting Commu-
nity Banks from the Volcker Rule.
As explained above, the House’s Financial Choice Act is the least
valid option. The Financial Choice Act uses a broad-brush to attempt
to fix a problem that requires a more finessed approach. Requiring
Community Banks to abide by the Volcker Rule is the equivalent of
presuming guiltiness before innocence is proven.161 The same cannot
be said of Big Banks, whose actions caused the recession of 2008 in
the first place. To return to the status quo would reward Big Banks,
while forgetting the lessons of the recession of 2008. That being said,
the complete elimination of the Volcker Rule for all banks would be
preferable to the current situation. But there are better alternatives.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, Community Banks should be completely exempted
from the Volcker Rule for a number of reasons. First and foremost,
the Volcker Rule was designed to prevent the failure of incredibly
large financial institutions. From a policy standpoint, regulating Big
Banks and Community Banks the same way does not make sense.
While Big Banks and Community Banks offer similar services, both
types of banks serve a unique role in the economy.162 The failure of a
Community Bank would not have near the amount of devastating ef-
fects on the economy as a Big Bank failure. Second, Community
159. Id.
160. Tracy, supra note 59.
161. Id.
162. See Community Banks Build Communities, supra note 88.
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Banks rarely engage in proprietary trading or enter into relationships
with private equity funds.163 Yet, Community Banks are nonetheless
saddled with the administrative costs of ensuring that employees are
not engaging in the type of behavior that the Volcker Rule prohib-
its.164 Finally, by requiring Community Banks to comply with the
Volcker Rule, the legislature is actually assisting Big Banks in growing
even larger, which enables them to once again become too big to fail.
The extra costs associated with compliance to the Volcker Rule con-
tributes to the financial stress Community Banks face, which in turn
makes Community Banks more susceptible to failure or acquisition by
larger banks.
This Article does not take the view that Big Banks are the villains
they are often made out to be in the media. Nor does it take the view
that there is anything inherently wrong with the business practices of
Big Banks. Moreover, it does not take any stance on whether regula-
tion on Big Banks should be increased. Big Banks play a substantial
role in the national economy. Other types of banks play an important
role, albeit on a smaller economic scale. But Dodd–Frank was enacted
in response to the business practices of Big Banks, not other types of
banks. So why do we regulate all banks the same? To put this in a
more colloquial sense, why are we treating apples like oranges?
While they still face many hurdles, the recent developments in both
the legislative and the executive branch are encouraging. The struggle
of Community Banks is finally coming to the attention of lawmakers.
After enduring years of costly and unnecessary regulation imposed by
the Volcker Rule, Community Banks may find relief one day soon.
While the adoption of the Senate Banking Committee bill would be
the superior option, an executive order is also a solution to relieving
the burden of the Volcker Rule from Community Banks. In either
event, the burden on Community Banks would be, while not com-
pletely eliminated, substantially reduced.
163. MNUCHIN & PHILLIPS, supra note 109, at 72–73.
164. Id. at 72.
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